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Revenue Implications of New York City’s Tax System
Jesse Edgerton, Andrew F. Haughwout, and Rae Rosen
A study of New York City’s tax system finds that over the past three decades, the system 
has become less reliant on property and general sales taxes and more dependent on corporate
and personal income taxes. This shift has made the city’s tax revenues less stable than 
the revenues of the 1970s and more sensitive to cyclical swings.
J
uly 2008 marks the expiration of the New
York State Financial Emergency Act for the
City of New York,a set of regulations govern-
ing fiscal policymaking that was adopted during New York
City’s financial crisis of the mid-1970s.While the city’s fis-
cal condition has improved dramatically since the act was
passed,problems remain.Events of recent fiscal years—in
particular,the economic downturn—have brought to light
certain budgetary instabilities.
In this issue of Second District Highlights,we examine a
key source of instability in New York City’s budget: its tax
revenues.We find that the city’s tax system of the 1970s—
one dominated by property taxes—over the years has
become more dependent on personal and corporate
income taxes.1 This shift has tied the city to a less stable
and more cyclically sensitive tax base,and has exacerbated
the city’s recent revenue shortfalls.
A more variable tax base places considerable challenges
before city officials because expenditures—financed in
large part by tax revenues—are difficult to reduce in the
short run.Accordingly,we also describe a range of policy
options that city officials could consider to address these
challenges, some of which would require legislative
changes.However,the timing of the Financial Emergency
Act’s expiration could offer New York City a unique oppor-
tunity to recognize the experiences of the past thirty years
and reevaluate its budget practices.
New York City’s Tax Revenues and Expenditures
New York City generates revenues from four major taxes:
property,personal income,general sales,and general cor-
poration.The city’s reliance on these taxes has increased
over the past three decades: the taxes’ share of general
expenditures rose from about 40 percent in 1970 to a little
more than 50 percent in 1999 (Chart 1).Smaller taxes,fees,
and grants-in-aid finance most of the remainder. The
decline in tax revenues that accompanied the city’s recent
downturn reduced the 50 percent figure to slightly less
than 45 percent of general expenditures in 2002.2
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The composition of the city’s four-tax major revenue
sources has changed markedly over the period.In 1970,per-
sonal income and general corporation tax revenues made up
about 15 percent of the four-tax total (and 6 percent of gen-
eral expenditures).The combined share of these two taxes
peaked at about 40 percent of the four-tax total in the late
1990s,reflecting the city’s trend toward income taxation.In
fiscal year 2002,that share dropped—from 39.3 percent to
33.7 percent—as a result of personal and corporate income
tax sensitivity to prevailing economic conditions.
When the U.S. recession began in February 2001, city
revenues derived from personal income and general corpo-
ration taxation fell quickly and dramatically.Real revenues
from the personal income tax declined 19 percent between
fiscal years 2000 and 2002 and general corporation revenues
plunged 23 percent.However,property tax revenues contin-
ued to grow,rising by 6 percent over the two years,enough to
offset a relatively small 9 percent decline in general sales tax
revenues.In fiscal years 2002 and 2003,the city generated
additional cash by relying largely on asset sales,budget cuts,
and increases in the property,general sales,and personal
income taxes; it also borrowed in fiscal year 2003 from the
Transitional Finance Authority.3
New York City’s budgets are influenced to a large extent
by the Financial Emergency Act’s requirement that the city
comply with generally accepted accounting principles.
Under the act,the city is prohibited from running budget
deficits—a projected deficit greater than $100 million trig-
gers a takeover of New York City finances by the Financial
Control Board.The city is also limited in its ability to hold
cash reserves that arise from unexpectedly strong tax
receipts, and thus cannot maintain a “rainy-day”fund of
more than $100 million.At best—as it did in the 1990s—
the city can use surplus funds to prepay subsidies to noncity
agencies, such as the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority,and to service its debt.4These constraints make it
difficult for the city to cushion its budget from the effects of
the business cycle.
The task of reducing expenditures in the short term also
presents challenges to the city.For example,a large share of
city expenses is determined by either contractual obliga-
tions or entitlements.Therefore,when the economy turns
sour, as it did in 2001-2002, the combination of cyclical
revenues, limited cash reserves, and fixed expenditures
forces the city to resort to tax rate increases and asset sales
to close budget gaps.
Properties of Tax Bases
Revenue data do not tell the whole story of how a city’s reve-
nue sources evolve.The revenues obtained from a tax are the
product of the tax’s effective rate and the base upon which
the tax is levied.Therefore, the changes in revenues from
each tax can be broken down into base and rate changes.
When projections suggest that the economy,or revenues,will
grow slowly or decline, municipal officials may raise tax
rates,making the revenue effect smaller than it would have
been without the policy change.Since the revenue response
to the economic change can thus be more muted than the tax
base response,tax revenues alone can provide an inaccurate
gauge of evolving tax bases.
Accordingly,a study of developments in a city’s revenue
sources should consider certain properties of tax bases.We
examine two such properties—persistence and volatility—
that economists use to describe the stability of macro-
economic series such as GDP.5 We also examine a third: the
economic sensitivity of a city’s tax bases.
2
Sources: New York City Office of the Comptroller (various years); Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (index of coincident economic indicators).
Notes: The dashed segment of the general expenditures line represents 1976 and 
1977, years for which data are not available. The four taxes are property, personal 
income, general sales, and general corporation.
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The more strongly positive the relationship is between the
current year’s and previous year’s growth,the more persistent
the tax base is said to be.That is,in a highly persistent base,
growth in one year is unlikely to turn into a sudden decline
in the next.Taxation of a persistent base thus requires rela-
tively few rate adjustments to generate a steady stream of
revenues.Put another way,if the officials who determine tax
rates assume that next year’s base growth will resemble this
year’s,then they will usually be right when the base in ques-
tion is persistent.Conversely,they will often be wrong when
the base is not persistent,and budget gaps,both surpluses
and deficits,could ensue.
The second important property of a tax base is itsvolatil-
ity,or the size of unexpected changes in the base.A highly
volatile tax base exhibits large, unanticipated deviations
from its trend,while a less volatile base displays only small
deviations.Volatile tax bases are uncertain—knowing the
current year’s performance provides little indication of what
the tax base will do next year. This uncertainty leads to
unpredictable revenues and the risk of large budget gaps.
Finally,economic sensitivity describes the strength of the
relationship between a tax base and the current state of the
economy.Sensitive,or procyclical,bases move in close step
with the economy—falling,for example,when the economy
declines—while insensitive ones are relatively unaffected by
short-run economic shifts. Tax bases that tend to drop
sharply when the economy slows can expose a city to budget-
ary shortfalls,because many city-financed expenditures do
not automatically shrink with a slowing economy.
Other features of a tax base can also affect its strength.
One is its relationship to other taxes.In particular,a base
that tends to rise or remain constant when other bases are
falling can be a useful cushion against sharp declines in
aggregate revenues.Another important consideration is the
relationship between the base of a tax and changes in its
rates.When the base is unaffected by changes in the rate,
taxation has little or no effect on the level of the taxed activ-
ity.When the base is responsive to rate changes,additional
revenue can be raised only at a substantial cost in efficiency
to the overall economy.6
Analyzing the Properties of New York City’s
Major Tax Bases
Important information about the behavior of New York City’s
four major taxes can be obtained by charting their bases over
time.Chart 2 shows in real terms the paths of the city’s four
major tax bases since 1970,and Chart 3 presents the relevant
rates.7We use this information to examine the properties of
the bases.
Persistence
The city’s property tax base is more persistent than the per-
sonal income tax base,as demonstrated by the relatively long
periods over which it is either rising or falling (Chart 2).For
both the general sales and property tax bases,one year of
above-trend growth tends to be followed by another. The
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Source: Authors’ calculations, using data from New York City Office of the 
Comptroller (various years) and New York City Office of Management and 
Budget (2002).
Notes: A large decline occurs in the personal income tax base in 1971, followed 
by an immediate rise in 1972. Although the data for these years are calculated 
the same way as they are for other years, the data could have been affected by 
the timing of a tax increase in 1971. Eliminating 1970 and 1971 from the data 
has no qualitative effect on the results in Tables 1 and 2.
Chart 2
Four Major New York City Tax Bases and Current 
Economic Conditions
Billions of 1993 dollars
New York City index of coincident
economic indicators
Scale           
            Scale
























02 00 95 90 85 80 75 1970
            Scale
General sales             Scale
General corporation
Source: New York City Office of Management and Budget (2002).
Chart 3













02 00 95 90 85 80 75 1970
PropertyCURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 10, NUMBER 4
personal income tax base,however,changes direction much
more frequently. Indeed, above-trend growth in one year
tends to be followed by below-trend growth in the next.
Table 1 presents statistical evidence supporting these
observations.The coefficient on lagged growth in the personal
income base is -0.440,indicating an absence of persist-
ence: above-trend (below-trend) growth in one year is,on
average,followed by below-trend (above-trend) growth in
the next.Conversely,positive figures for the property and
general sales bases suggest persistence: above-trend
(below-trend) growth in one year is,on average,followed
by above-trend (below-trend) growth in the next.The gen-
eral corporation figure is statistically indistinguishable
from zero,providing no evidence for the presence of per-
sistence.Accordingly,the assumption that current changes
in New York City’s general sales and property taxes would
persist into the next year would generally be correct,while
a similar assumption for personal income tax revenues
would typically be incorrect.
Volatility
The four taxes we consider are each volatile in the sense that
unexpected changes in their bases are quite substantial
compared with unexpected changes in the city’s index of
coincident economic indicators.8 But how do the four bases
compare in volatility? Table 1 presents the unexplained vari-
ation for each tax base; higher numbers indicate greater
volatility. It is evident from the table that the bases of
New York City’s property (7.6 percent) and general sales 
(3.6 percent) taxes are less volatile than the personal
income (14.5 percent) and general corporation (9.5 per-
cent) tax bases.
Economic Sensitivity
Tax bases that are sensitive to shifts in economic conditions
can expose a city to budgetary shortfalls.New York City’s
personal income,general corporation,and general sales tax
bases appear to rise and fall at the same time as the index of
coincident economic indicators,while the property tax base
appears to move independently (Chart 2).Table 1 offers evi-
dence supporting this observation.Higher numbers reflect
greater sensitivity.The city’s personal income and general
corporation tax bases are shown to be the most economically
sensitive,responding immediately and strongly to changes
in the index.The general sales tax base also responds imme-
diately,but less strongly.Significantly,changes in the prop-
erty tax base show no clear short-run sensitivity to changes
in the index.
Implications of New York City’s Tax Rate Structure
Our analysis suggests that New York City’s current tax rate
structure produces revenues that are more sensitive to local
economic shifts than were tax revenues three decades ago.
Chart 4 compares the city’s actual revenues with the reve-
nues the city would have received had it left the 1970 rate
structure in place for the entire thirty-three years.It is evi-
dent that the city raised rates overall after 1970, and the
resulting system generated much more revenue over the next
thirty years—$43 billion in 1993 dollars—than the city
would have received had it left rates at their 1970 levels.9
Nevertheless, we estimate that the 1970 structure would




of Four Major New York City Tax Bases
Personal General General
Characteristic Property Income Sales Corporation
Persistence 0.619 -0.440 0.520 0.082
(0.142) (0.132) (0.184) (0.197)
Volatility 7.6 14.5 3.6 9.5
Sensitivity 0.072 1.355 0.749 0.825
(0.412) (0.525) (0.108) (0.373)
Source:Authors’calculations.
Notes:Persistence figures are calculated as the coefficient on the lagged growth rate
in a regression of the annual growth rate on the lagged growth rate and a constant.
Volatility figures are calculated as 100 multiplied by the standard error of the residu-
als in a regression of the annual growth rate on the lagged growth rate and a con-
stant.Sensitivity figures are calculated as the coefficient on the growth rate of eco-
nomic activity in a regression of the annual growth rate on the growth rate of eco-
nomic activity and a constant.Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations, using data from New York City Office of the 
Comptroller (various years).
Note: The four taxes are property, personal income, general sales, and general 
corporation.
Chart 4
Actual Revenues versus Revenues under Fixed 1970 Rates
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during both the recent downturn and that of the early 1990s.
This result reflects the fact that the city’s property and gen-
eral sales tax bases,which dominated the 1970 structure,are
far less sensitive to the economy than are the personal
income and general corporation bases,upon which the city
now relies more heavily.
The city’s current (2002) tax structure also provides a less
persistent revenue stream than the 1970 structure did.Table 2
compares the revenue characteristics of the current tax sys-
tem with those of a system based on 1970 rates.The key dif-
ference between them is the current system’s shift from
property taxes to personal income and general corporation
taxes.In addition,the personal income and general corpora-
tion taxes tend to decline (along with the general sales tax)
at the same time.Therefore,by increasing the importance of
the personal income and general corporation tax bases in its
revenue structure,New York City has developed a revenue
system that is less persistent and more sensitive to the econ-
omy.10Changes in the city’s tax structure have,in fact,gener-
ated more revenue—yet this outcome has been achieved by
relying on the less stable and more economically sensitive
bases.
Policy Options
The increased sensitivity of New York City’s four major tax
bases to the economic cycle can complicate the task of
budget officials.Accordingly,we describe a range of possible
options available to policymakers interested in reducing the
city’s revenue variability.Moreover,if legislation is required
to amend the budget process,the July 2008 expiration of the
Financial Emergency Act affords an opportunity to intro-
duce such changes.
One option for policymakers is to do nothing.The city
would likely continue to encounter revenue shortfalls during
downturns and could temporarily adjust tax rates to raise
revenues and balance its budget.Over the past thirty years,
the city has made its revenue stream almost completely
insensitive to the business cycle by increasing rates when tax
base growth was slow or negative. AsTable 2 shows, our
measure of the economic sensitivity of the city’s actual four-
tax revenues is statistically indistinguishable from zero,sug-
gesting that rate increases have almost exactly offset the
declines in tax bases that accompany downturns. This
practice of raising tax rates during downturns and lower-
ing them during upswings is often thought to amplify the
magnitude of the business cycle. However, as Edgerton,
Haughwout,and Rosen (2004) argue,it is difficult to deter-
mine whether New York City’s cyclical adjustments of the
personal income tax rate do,in fact,have this effect.
A second option is for the city to reduce permanently its
reliance on the personal income tax11 and general corpora-
tion tax and increase the effective tax rate on property.As we
have shown,the city’s property tax base is the least economi-
cally sensitive of its four major bases (Table 1); therefore,a
revenue system that relied more heavily on the property tax
than does the current system might be more resistant to
changing economic conditions (Table 2). An increased
reliance on the property tax could also reduce the magnitude
of the revenue shortfalls that accompany downturns as well
as decrease the need for procyclical tax rate adjustments.
However,offsetting factors associated with this option
would also have to be considered.For instance,permanent
increases in the city’s property tax rate have been shown to
have negative effects on its base—an outcome that could
limit the tax’s revenue potential (Haughwout et al.2003).
Therefore,a heightened emphasis on the property tax could
be most effective as part of a comprehensive reform plan12
Table 2
New York City Revenue Characteristics under Different Rate Combinations
Tax Rate (Percent)
Personal General General Revenue Characteristic
Category Property Income Sales Corporation Persistence Volatility Sensitivity
Actual revenues — — — — 0.436 4.1 -0.008
Fixed 1970 rates 3.71 0.64 3.0 5.6 0.548 5.9 0.347
Fixed 2002 rates 2.40 1.17 4.0 8.9 0.329 5.8 0.552
Source:Authors’calculations.
Note:Persistence,volatility, and sensitivity figures are described in Table 1.
The increased sensitivity of New York
City’s four major tax bases to the economic
cycle can complicate the task of budget
officials. CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 10, NUMBER 4
that remedies inefficiencies in the tax while reducing any
negative revenue effects on the city.
Third,with legislative changes to the Financial Emergency
Act,the city could establish a meaningful rainy-day fund to
reconcile future budget gaps.Research and the experience of
recent downturns indicate that adequate funding for such
accounts is important for determining the accounts’success
in cushioning downturns, but states have had difficulty
maintaining sufficiently large fund accumulations.13
A fourth possibility is for New York City to continue to
prepay debt service and certain smaller expenses to external
agencies for each oncoming fiscal year.14 This option could
preserve current spending patterns,yet it could also limit the
city’s ability to manage finances in a prolonged downturn.
Finally,the city could create a new external agency for
capital projects and finance it with windfall tax revenues as
well as with ongoing funding.In addition to providing dedi-
cated funds for capital projects that would persist through a
downturn,this option could offer a major policy benefit in
the sense that windfall tax revenues would not become
embedded in the city’s operating budget,permanently rais-
ing planned expenditures. The city could thus develop a
“pay-as-you-go”plan for capital projects.While such pay-as-
you-go plans represent a common form of financing in most
municipalities, New York City funds all capital spending
through debt.A change in the financing of the city’s capital
budget could therefore lower the cost of debt service,free up
additional funds for city services,and accordingly reduce the
need for tax increases.
Any of these last three options would likely be even more
effective in conjunction with rules defining surplus funds or
windfall tax revenues.15 The label windfall tax revenues char-
acterizes the funds as unusual—collected, perhaps, at a
cyclical peak—and implies that such growth rates are
unlikely to be sustained.Windfall tax revenues might there-
fore be segregated and placed in a rainy-day fund or the
capital budget,because they are not viewed as a stable source
of revenue for the operating budget.
Conclusion
The mix of New York City’s four major tax revenue streams
has shifted over the past three decades to become more
dependent on the personal income and general corporation
taxes and less reliant on the property and general sales
taxes. This change has made the city’s tax revenues less 
stable than the revenues of the 1970s and more sensitive to
cyclical swings.
Today’s tax system places considerable challenges before
New York City officials,who must impose sudden and large
tax increases or budget cuts when the local economy con-
tracts. Our analysis suggests that there are other policy
options for these officials to consider—some ofwhich would
require new legislation or amendments. Significantly, the
opening for such a change is on the horizon,with the upcom-
ing expiration of the New York State Financial Emergency
Act for the City of New York.This occasion could enable the
city to build upon its experiences of the past three decades
and move its budget practices in a new direction.
Notes
1. In this sense, New York City is not unlike other state and local governments.
However, by 2002, the city was unusually dependent on the income tax for a
local government. See George Sweeting, “Tax Tales: The City’s Changing Tax
Revenue Mix over Twenty-Five Years,” NewsFax no. 108, New York City
Independent Budget Office, October 2002. 
2. Note that our analysis excludes the city’s fiscal year 2003 tax increases,
which raised personal income, general sales, and property taxes. Our conclu-
sions are unaffected by this exclusion.
3. Alan G. Hevesi, State Comptroller, Office of the State Deputy Comptroller
for the City of New York, Review of the Four-Year Financial Plan for the City of
New York, Report no. 9-2004, July 2003. 
4. New York State Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York, New
York Unconsolidated Laws, §§ 5401-5420, L. 1975, c. 868, § 2; and H. Carl
McCall, State Comptroller, Office of the State Deputy Comptroller for the
City of New York, Review of the Financial Plan for the City of New York:
Fiscal Years 2001-2004, Report no. 6-2001, December 2000.
5. See McConnell, Mosser, and Perez-Quiros (1999). 
6. The responsiveness of tax bases to revenue changes is discussed more fully
in other studies. For example, Haughwout et al. (2003) explore the responsive-
ness of tax bases to tax rates in New York City and three other cities.
7. For the city’s property tax, we use as our base measure market value of tax-
able property, as estimated by the State Office of Real Property Services. For
the other taxes, we estimate the base from average rate and revenue informa-
tion. See New York City Office of Management and Budget (2002).
8. The index of coincident economic indicators is a measure of local economic
conditions. The New York City index is described fully in Orr, Rich, and Rosen
(1999).
9. These figures are obtained by applying the 1970 rate to the observed tax
base in each year, then aggregating across taxes. Thus, they ignore the possibil-
ity that changes in rates since 1970 have affected the bases upon which they are
levied. If that is true, and Haughwout et al. (2003) argue that it is, then this pro-
cedure overstates the aggregate revenue that the 1970 structure would have
generated for those taxes whose rates ultimately fell (property), and under-
states it for those taxes whose rates rose (personal income, general sales, and
general corporation). 
10. Figures in Table 2 suggest that the volatility of the 1970 rate system is mar-
ginally higher than that of the 2002 system. This result is due to the fact that the
overall variance of revenues is lower in the 2002 system because revenues have
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become less dependent on a single tax base (property). Although the strength of
persistence in revenues also declines, the reduction in overall variance offsets
this effect, leaving volatility hardly changed.
11. By de-emphasizing the personal income tax, New York City would essentially
be harking back to its policy of the 1970s. To understand why the policy may
have changed—that is, why the city increased its reliance on income taxes after
1975—see Fuchs (1992, pp. 185-6).
12. Some commentators contend that New York City’s property tax as currently
constituted is in need of reform (see, for example, George Sweeting, “City Tax
System Is Out of Whack,” New York Daily News, November 25, 2002). 
13. See Steve Gold, “Preparing for the Next Recession: Rainy-Day Funds and
Other Tools for States,” Legislative Finance Paper no. 41, State-Local Finance
Project, National Council of State Legislators, December 30, 1983; and Russell S.
Sobel and Randall G. Holcombe, “The Impact of State Rainy-Day Funds in
Easing State Fiscal Crises during the 1990-91 Recession,” Public Budgeting and
Finance16, no. 3 (fall 1996): 28. 
14. For example, the city used surplus revenues to prepay expenses to the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority in fiscal year 2001.
15. “Windfall tax revenues,” for instance, could be considered tax revenue
growth in excess of the current rate of inflation plus 3 percentage points, or any
growth in excess of the average growth rate of tax collections over the prior busi-
ness cycle or past two cycles.
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